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Abstract: Decentralisation as a concept is attracting a lot of interest, not least with the rise of 
decentralised and distributed techno-social systems like Bitcoin, and distributed ledgers more 
generally. In this paper, we first define decentralisation as it is implemented for technical 
architectures and then discuss the technical, social, political and economic ideas that drive the 
development of decentralised, and in particular, distributed systems. We argue that technical 
efforts towards decentralisation tend to go hand-in-hand with ambitions for rearranging power 
dynamics. We caution, however, against simplistic understandings of power in relation to the 
decentralisation-centralisation spectrum, and argue that in practice, decentralisation might very 
well be served by and produce centralising effects. The paper then goes on to discuss the critical 
literature that highlights some of the common assumptions and critiques made about 
decentralisation and the pros and cons of a decentralised approach. Finally, we propose some of 
the missing parts to current debates about decentralisation, and argue for a more nuanced and 
grounded approach to the centralisation/decentralisation dichotomy. 
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This article belongs to Concepts of the digital society, a special section of Internet Policy 
Review guest-edited by Christian Katzenbach and Thomas Christian Bächle. 
1. Introduction 
The concept of decentralisation traverses multiple contexts, fields and disciplines. 
We begin this multidisciplinary discussion on decentralisation with describing the 
technical definitions and motivations for decentralisation in network engineering. 
We then move on to discuss the broader motivations for such decentralised net-
works, which span social, political and economic aims. Our intention is not to com-
pare cases of decentralisation across disciplines and contexts as much as to point 
out that a study of technical decentralisation will invariably invoke, but not always 
produce, forms of social, political and economic decentralisation. In the process, we 
identify a shared concern among the vastly different contexts, definitions and uses 
of the term: the discontent with, and the reform of existing power relations, 
whether expressed in technical or social terms. 
Decentralised and distributed technical systems have given rise to some truly 
unique social and economic practices. The success of the BitTorrent file-sharing 
protocol contributed to the rise of anti-copyright political movements, and shifted 
multiple business practices. The Tor network (https://www.torproject.org/) provides 
secure communications to individuals vulnerable to surveillance, censorship or 
prosecution. Blockchain created a global network of value transfer outside of ex-
isting institutional frameworks. Under various labels, such as ‘web 3.0’, ‘re-decen-
tralisation’, or ‘blockchains’, various communities have been trying to implement 
techno-social systems where technical decentralisation is consciously used to pur-
sue social, economic, or political goals. In practice, however, such projects often in-
volve and depend on centralised infrastructures or decision-making, or indeed pro-
duce centralising effects. Rather than this necessarily being a critique of such pro-
jects, we argue that the coexistence of different systems in practice presents an 
opportunity to develop more nuanced analyses of the properties, benefits and 
downsides to both centralised and decentralised technical architectures. In the fol-
lowing, we catalogue the drivers of decentralisation, but also point to those oft-
hidden factors, which may limit the uncritical, cross-domain application of decen-
tralisation as an organisational schema to implement, as opposed to imagine al-
ternative modes of social order. 
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2. Decentralisation as a network topology - the 
technical definition 
Decentralisation is often used as a general term for describing network architec-
tures that more precisely span from decentralised to distributed. Nevertheless, the 
distinctions are technically significant: the topology of networks (their nodes and 
their interconnections) determines their properties (Bondy & Murty, 2008). One 
widely referenced classification of network topologies distinguishes between cen-
tralised, decentralised, and distributed networks (Baran, 1964). 
FIGURE 1: Various network topologies. (Baran, 1964) 
In this schematic, centralised describes a network with one central node (for ex-
ample a server), or a cluster of tightly connected nodes, that is connected to all 
other nodes in the network (clients), while all these other nodes are only connect-
ed to this single central node. As a consequence, the failure or destruction of the 
central node disconnects all nodes from the network, and prevents them from 
communicating with each other. 
In a decentralised network, there is a hierarchy of nodes, where nodes at the bot-
tom of the hierarchy essentially are part of a small star network that connects 
them with a node one level higher in the hierarchy. These nodes are again part of 
another star network connecting them to the next higher-level node in the hierar-
chy. Failure of a few nodes in a decentralised network still leaves several connect-
ed components of nodes that will be able to communicate with each other (but 
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not with nodes in a different component). 
At the other end of the spectrum, distributed networks are networks where every 
node has roughly the same number of connections (called edges) to other nodes. 
Distributed networks have the property whereby failure of a few nodes (even if 
they are chosen more or less on purpose) still leaves the network connected, al-
lowing all nodes to communicate with each other (albeit over a possibly much 
longer path than in the original network). 
The more distributed a network is, the more resilient it is overall to various forms 
of disturbances and the less dependent the network as a whole is on any single 
node. This also suggests that the network might be less dependent on any particu-
lar person, company or organisation that would be operating a particular node. In-
deed, the fact that the internet is decentralised, but not distributed, has become a 
major technical argument for why governments and technology companies are 
able to exert more control over it than the internet pioneers envisioned (Barlow, 
1996; Galloway, 2004; Kaiser, 2019; Snowden, 2019; Walch, 2019). These proper-
ties have granted significant ‘narrative power’ to the distributed network topology 
(Reijers & Coeckelbergh, 2018) and to Baran’s network diagrams as illustrative of a 
story of power as well as network typologies. 
The concepts of centralization / decentralization / distribution can apply to both 
physical and virtual networks, further strengthening its appeal and applicability. 
The internet itself is a concrete decentralised network (with actual physical con-
nections between nodes) but we often experience it as a centralised virtual net-
work when we connect to centralised web servers, services and platforms. 
The virtual client-server structure, strengthened both through business models 
and technical means, have allowed companies like Amazon, Facebook and Google 
to establish highly centralised virtual networks of communications or commerce 
across decentralised concrete networks (van Dijck et al., 2018). Partly in response 
to the heavily centralised nature of key online services (search, communication, 
content distribution), decentralised, or distributed alternatives have been proposed 
(e.g. Mastodon, Solid, etc,). Decentralization, and especially distributed networks, 
however, come with particular technical challenges. 
2.1 Challenges in distributed systems 
Radically decentralized, i.e. distributed network topologies raise unique chal-
lenges, such as those related to coordination and fault tolerance. In distributed 
networks no single centre of control exists that can ensure coordination. Instead, 
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distributed networks are organised through protocols, which spell out the generic 
rules and technical standards nodes need to follow to be able to join the network 
(Galloway, 2004). 
The two most important roles of protocols in distributed systems are to (1) facili-
tate coordination or ‘consensus’ in the network, and (2) make the system tolerant 
to faults. Coordination rules are necessary, since no single node has a complete, 
consistent, real-time view of the state of the system. A classical coordination prob-
lem studied in this setting is the mutual exclusion problem, where one critical re-
source (say a network printer) is shared among several nodes, and where each of 
the nodes needs exclusive access to the resource every once in a while, to com-
plete a task (as otherwise the pages of several documents would get garbled when 
printed) (Dijkstra, 1983). Other coordination challenges include efficient routing, 
the sharing of global information on the state of the network, and dealing with 
faults in the network. 
The problem of fault-tolerance entails how to ensure that the overall network re-
mains functional while some of its components fail. Designers and engineers con-
sider several failure scenarios for distributed systems: where nodes become un-
available, display unexpected, or unaccounted for behaviour, as well as what are 
called Byzantine failures, where nodes attempt malicious, manipulative or destruc-
tive behaviour. Under certain conditions, so-called Byzantine Agreement protocols 
exist that allow a system to agree on a common output even if at most one-third 
of the nodes are faulty or malicious (Lamport et al., 2019). Fully asynchronous sys-
tems (where there are no time bounds), however, defy solutions to the Byzantine 
Agreement problem (Fischer et al., 1985). 
Distributed architectures can increase a network’s fault-tolerance by increasing the 
amount of nodes that would need to be faulty in order to compromise the whole 
network, but distribution often comes at a cost. For example, geographical distrib-
ution might increase resilience to environmental catastrophes, such that for exam-
ple a power outage affecting nodes in one place does not affect nodes elsewhere, 
therefore keeping the network running. However, such geographical distribution in 
the meantime introduces vulnerabilities to the connectivity of the network. 
Protocols, such as the TCP/IP protocol of the internet, or something more complex 
like the Bitcoin protocol do not define and regulate all aspects and all possible be-
haviour of and within the system. The overall properties of a distributed system 
arise, in theory, from emergent behaviour caused by local decisions, made by local 
nodes, based only on local information. Therefore, some failures, which emerge 
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from the autonomous actions of individual nodes are systemic in nature. Systemic 
failures do not have a solution within the network, nor in the protocol rules that 
govern its technical aspects, and they require some form of external control, such 
as institutional governance, to address. For example, the maintenance, and devel-
opment of protocols which govern distributed networks are often controlled by 
centralised, hierarchical, closed, or charismatic forms of authority, such as bureau-
cratic organisations, engineering meritocracies, or charismatic leaders (O’Neil, 
2014). Consequently, changes, upgrades to the protocol layer, and the handling of 
issues that lay outside of the purview of the existing protocol are governed by oth-
er means (Katzenbach & Ulbricht, 2019) for example decision making bodies, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, legal certainty through regulation, etc. 
Absent from such governance frameworks, distributed networks based on volun-
tary participation may face a split, or ‘forking’, and the establishment of a new net-
work under new rules. Successful forks in networks are rare: the setup of a new 
network is always costly, and carries the risk of either, or both networks failing, the 
former because of bad rules, the latter because of lack of sufficient support (Azouvi 
et al., 2018). More complex external governance mechanisms introduce trade-offs 
and conflicts between different layers of the network, their degree of decentralisa-
tion, and effectiveness. Despite various efforts, to this date, no distributed network 
has been able to develop a distributed and effective form of governance which is 
able to seamlessly blend technical and human aspects of rulemaking, conflict res-
olution and enforcement and/or remove the messy human components from the 
governance process (Azouvi et al., 2018; De Filippi, 2019; De Filippi & Loveluck, 
2016; Méadel et al., 2017; Reijers et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, due to the success of practical distributed applications like P2P sys-
tems (Buford et al., 2009), blockchain, and distributed ledgers (Buterin, 2013; 
Nakamoto, 2008; Narayanan et al., 2016) and secure multiparty computations 
(Cramer et al., 2015; Yao, 1982) radical decentralisation has once again been pro-
posed in other domains (Bodó & Giannopoulou, 2019). 
3. Drivers for decentralisation across disciplines 
In the previous section, we have given a technical definition of decentralisation, 
and mentioned a number of decentralised and distributed technological applica-
tions. In this section, we discuss the rationales behind choosing more decen-
tralised technical architectures over more centralised ones. First, we start with the 
concerns of computer science, and engineering. Then, we take a look at how these 
fundamentally technical considerations are intertwined with particular social, po-
6 Internet Policy Review 10(2) | 2021
litical, or economic considerations, and give support to decentralised, or even fully 
distributed social, political, and economic structures. 
3.1 Information security 
There are a number of motivations for decentralisation that stem from information 
security engineering. Radically decentralised network topologies are understood to 
be more resilient because (as discussed above) there is no ‘central point of failure’, 
meaning the network as a whole does not depend on any single node. If one node 
is compromised, the rest of the network will continue to function as intended. Dis-
tributed network topologies can be used to achieve privacy, censorship resistance, 
availability, and information integrity information security properties. In cen-
tralised network topologies traffic has to run through a specific server, which 
grants those who control and have access to that server significant powers to ob-
serve, manipulate, or cut off traffic (Troncoso et al., 2017). Distribution can en-
hance privacy and censorship resilience by ensuring that data are not held and con-
trolled by a third party (Diaz et al., 2008; Troncoso et al., 2020). Some decen-
tralised topologies can be used in a separation strategy (Hoepman, 2014), one of 
several privacy enhancing design strategies, by processing data locally on end user 
devices, or by splitting data across multiple nodes and only reassembled by the in-
tended recipient. Higher degrees of decentralisation also make it more expensive 
to observe network traffic because there are more nodes that would need to be 
monitored. It can therefore contribute towards anonymous or pseudonymous com-
munication (Meiklejohn et al., 2013). Decentralisation can also be used as a strate-
gy to improve availability. With data replicated across multiple nodes rather than 
held on one server, that data can be available even if a few nodes are offline. De-
centralisation can be used as a technique for ensuring the integrity and security of 
information because the information will be held across, authenticated and routed 
through, multiple different devices. 
Several of these security design benefits of decentralised and distributed topolo-
gies increase as the size of the network increases. When there are more nodes it 
becomes increasingly difficult for anyone to control enough of these to attack the 
network. Information security engineering, in the context of decentralised and dis-
tributed networks, therefore often focuses on thresholds of tolerance, namely how 
many nodes in the network would have to ‘collude’ in order to attack the network 
(for example Byzantine fault tolerance). These potential benefits of decentralisa-
tion however all depend on the specific systems designs, and the degree of decen-
tralisation. As argued by Troncoso et. al. (2017), if decentralisation is done naively 
it might multiply the attack vectors. And depending on the decentralised systems 
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design, distributed architectures in particular might also be worse in terms of 
availability and information integrity. With no central server, there might not be 
any clear oversight or guarantee that a given file will be available. For example, 
the DAT protocol (https://www.datprotocol.com/) for distributed networks has the 
benefit of being local-first and granting significant control and information security 
possibilities as content is served directly from people’s individual devices. If a per-
son is offline, the content they are serving will be unavailable unless otherwise 
arranged. This can be a feature or a bug depending on the system’s design and se-
curity requirements. Distributed systems therefore require establishing different 
patterns for interaction and usage than what has been established for traditional 
server-client networks (Wagner et al., 2020), or even many decentralised architec-
tures. 
3.2 Power 
The relationship between technical and non-technical discussions on the merits of 
decentralisation has been that of mutual inspiration. History, social, political theo-
ries, techno-social imaginaries, ideologies have informed those who designed de-
centralised technology architectures (Brunton, 2019; Golumbia, 2016; Roszak, 
1969; Swartz, 2018; Turner, 2006), and in turn, decentralised and distributed tech-
nical systems have been proposed as templates for alternative modes of social, 
economic, political organisations, hoping to address concerns of political oppres-
sion, economic inequality, or the existing power asymmetries of social interactions 
(Brekke, 2020; Erickson et al., 2015; Reijers & Coeckelbergh, 2018). Some P2P file-
sharing service operators, such as the Pirate Bay operators, based their anti-copy-
right struggle on the censorship resistant nature of the BitTorrent protocol. 
Nakamoto, the inventor(s) of bitcoin, had the explicit aim to remove central and 
commercial banks from their intermediary position in financial transactions. The 
Tor network is designed (in part) to provide an escape route from online censor-
ship and state surveillance. 
In its most general sense, the centralisation/decentralisation dichotomy is often 
framed in terms of power asymmetries. The greatest concern of libertarian and an-
archist thought is the abuse of political or economic power, born from specific his-
toric conditions and experiences (Boaz & Boaz, 2015; Graeber, 2004). These con-
cerns have had significant influence on the histories and designs of decentralised 
and distributed technical systems (Brekke, 2020). Some distributed networks are 
designed to consciously oppose existing power structures, such as P2P file sharing 
in case of copyright, or Tor in case of censorship. Other distributed forms of techni-
cal and social organisation (such as wireless mesh networks, digital cooperatives, 
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open source software development, P2P resource sharing networks, distributed au-
tonomous organisations and various forms of crowdfunding) offer alternatives to, 
or contest existing modes of social, political, economic collaboration in a non-con-
frontational way (Yeung, 2019). Distributed technologies thus fit into a larger his-
tory of struggles (Foucault, 1979; Said, 1986; J. C. Scott, 1985), in which power is 
continuously limited, contested, and negated through various (in this case techno-
social) counter-practices, conflicts, and escapist utopias (J. C. Scott, 1990). 
That being said, the claim of many decentralisation evangelists (such as some 
blockchain maximalists, and techno-libertarians), that decentralised, or distributed, 
non-hierarchical forms of organisation can, or indeed will abolish existing power 
structures within society seems to be overly optimistic. For one, distributed net-
works are rarely immune to the dynamics that create positions of power (i.e., pow-
er to exclude, but also to set rules, and mitigate disputes) in other forms of organi-
sation. Even if a network starts with a distributed design and a corresponding pro-
tocol, power can accumulate both in technical and social dimensions. Technical 
nodes can enjoy external advantages (such as cheaper power in the bitcoin net-
work, or better connectivity), which can be reinforced if the protocol favours the 
producers in a network at the expense of consumers. For example, in the BitTor-
rent and Tor networks preferential attachment rules favour nodes with higher 
bandwidth who provide connectivity to transacting bandwidth-consumers in the 
network. In blockchain networks miners (producers of security) are rewarded by 
transacting parties (consumers of the service). These dynamics shift resources and 
power to producers. Some of these flows can be addressed on the protocol level, 
when, for example, blockchain projects choose ASIC-resistance algorithms to 
counter the accumulation of power by those who can use purpose-built mining 
hardware. But such protocol changes only highlight the power issues at the social 
dimension of decentralised networks. At the minimum, changes to the protocol re-
quire some framework of coordination and decision making which can range from 
charismatic leadership, via meritocratic autocracy, to direct democracy. Even in the 
last case, beyond a certain scale, power tends to accumulate in the hands of those 
who have enough reputation, social capital, time, and other resources to partici-
pate in the governance process. In summary, particular network topologies (cen-
tralised, or distributed) rarely fully capture how power actually flows through and 
against those templates. In fact, power relations are multidimensional, and poly-
centric (Foucault, 2009). Both in complex social settings and in apparently simple 
technical systems multiple forms and sources of power intersect with each other. 
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3.3 Politics 
Decentralisation and distribution are often assumed to remedy the potential abuse 
of power of coercive intermediaries through disintermediation. Amongst some com-
munities, technical disintermediation is also thought to be a way to retire from 
politics. The assumption is that, if distributed networks ensure non-coercive coor-
dination, then the need for political governance is also resolved. The term ‘disin-
termediation’ invokes institutional theory, mostly to point to the costs, and rarely 
to the benefits of having privileged intermediaries in a network of relations. The 
removal of intermediaries who can control, censor, tax, limit, or boost particular 
social, economic interactions is believed to automatically lead to more freedom for 
transacting parties, and the types of transactions (Berners-Lee, 2019). However, 
central intermediating actors emerged because they deliver value: they lower 
transaction costs, coordinate action, define and enforce democratically agreed up-
on rules, correct failures, limit negative, and enhance positive externalities, which 
individual transactions cannot (Arrow, 1969; Coase, 1937). In contrast, parties in a 
distributed arrangement face exponentially growing transaction and coordination 
costs (Langlois & Garzarelli, 2008), a limited capacity to negotiate the general 
rules of the exchange, face take or leave decisions, may create substantial negative 
externalities, and often result in new, more insidious and invisible forms of inter-
mediation (Freeman, 1972). This is the main reason why in many instances (in the 
economy, political system, or computer networks) decentralised or even cen-
tralised, rather than distributed designs prevail. 
Disintermediation by distributed technologies is in fact a form of reintermediation, 
the replacement of one form of intermediary with another. Decentralised networks 
are institutional frameworks which enable, and facilitate transactions under their 
own particular rules, and come with their own particular costs and benefits, re-
garding the scope and depth and trustworthiness of the services they provide 
(Bodó, 2020). With time, many distributed technical systems developed more pro-
nounced, and often more centralised institutional functions and capacities. Closed 
torrent trackers provide originally unaccounted for benefits, such as quality assur-
ance, rules, and long tail availability, over the distributed P2P BitTorrent file shar-
ing network (Bodó, 2014). Blockchain networks implement formalised, and not ful-
ly distributed governance institutions, such as rule-setting, conflict resolution, ar-
bitration, also on top of the distributed ledger protocol (Europechain, 2020). De-
spite these efforts we are yet to see all functions of institutional intermediaries 
implemented in a fully distributed manner. 
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3.4 Economics 
The development of distributed and decentralised networks is historically inter-
twined with the economics discipline: the Austrian school economist Hayek, for ex-
ample, conceived markets as an ‘information processor’, a decentralised mechanism 
to coordinate resources and needs (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017). Distributed net-
work models therefore exhibit many of the same assumptions of market econom-
ics, namely: autonomous rational agents that interact solely via a perfect competi-
tive market; participants cannot unilaterally alter the rules; the resources are mo-
bile; network exit or entry has no cost. Historically, socially and politically these 
assumptions have been powerful in sustaining an ideology of the market as a non-
coercive coordination mechanism. However, markets require significant legal and 
ideological enforcement to function in practice, often with substantial systemic co-
ercion. As economic historians observed, every participant in a competitive market 
tries to be a monopolist (Braudel, 1992; De Landa, 1996). The exploitation of com-
petitive edges leads to the recentralisation of markets into monopolies. Without 
governance mechanisms in place, nodes may collude, people may lie to each other, 
markets can be rigged, and there can be significant cost to people entering and ex-
iting markets. 
That being said, there have been several attempts to experiment with new eco-
nomic models based on distributed networks. In hacker and free / open-source 
software cultures, information networks would enable information sharing at al-
most no cost, such that information, and in particular code, could form a common 
resource pool. Such open, free knowledge commons would then enable distributed 
logics of development and wealth creation. Many such efforts however were sub-
sequently capitalised on by firms, indeed contributing to technologies that have 
since become hugely centralised (Bodó, 2019; O’Neil et al., 2020; Szulik, 2018). 
Modularity has also been a key concept in the analysis of how decentralised and 
distributed networks enable new forms of collaborative production (Benkler, 2006). 
Modularity in technical systems means that each module is responsible for a par-
ticular task, invoking the help of other modules (to perform other tasks) through a 
clearly defined application programming interface (API). Modules could be devel-
oped more or less independently of each other. A classic example of such modules 
are the libraries that are part of the operating system, or software development kit. 
The growth of the web gave rise to the development of web services, which can al-
so be seen as remote modules. Instead of a single computer running the whole 
system including all of its modules, the system now depends on the remote execu-
tion of most of its tasks by some other server. Many client server systems (which 
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are the epitome of centralised networks) grew from this model. We should not 
confuse modularity with distributed network or decentralisation though. In distrib-
uted networks, the idea is not so much to split a larger task into smaller and differ-
ent subtasks each performed by a different module, but rather to divide the same 
task over many nodes that all cooperate and coordinate to execute it. Loosely 
speaking, distribution is concerned with sharing resources (like storage space or 
computation power), and only rarely with distributing tasks. 
In the social/economic domain the breakdown of the production process to small 
chunks, requiring little expertise is a Fordist / Taylorist invention (Beniger, 1986). 
The commons-based peer production framework proposed that such modular 
labour can also take place voluntarily, in the service of unowned, or communally 
owned and used resources, outside of the traditional frameworks of the firm and 
the market (Benkler, 2006; O’Neil, 2015). The peer production logic combines the 
division of labour and expertise with the redundancy and collaboration of distrib-
uted networks. Knowledge would be shared across networks, as a commons, with 
production taking place in a distributed manner. 
Software libraries, maintained as independent open-source projects, are a prime 
example of a modular technical system, produced by a modular organisation of 
labour, where many independent developers that do not necessarily know or even 
trust each other together contribute to an overarching system. Yet, as O’Neil (2014) 
notes, many factors, including the scale of such modular production networks, 
have an impact on whether modularity, as an organising principle, is effective 
without formal, often centralised, authoritative structures of governance. 
More recently, blockchain and distributed ledger technologies have given rise to 
new experimentation with markets and economic ideas whereby hackers and in-
formation security engineers have been borrowing concepts from different schools 
of economics to serve the aims of organising and funding distributed networks, 
motivated by anti-authoritarian ideologies across the political spectrum (Atzori, 
2015; Brekke, 2020; Davidson et al., 2018; B. Scott, 2015; Swartz, 2018). These ef-
forts range from cryptoeconomics whereby economic concepts are used to achieve 
information security properties (Brekke & Alsindi, 2021; Buterin, 2017; Zamfir, 
2015) to token economics (Voshgmir, 2019) to new ways of organising commons 
(Rozas et al., 2018) and ideas such as bonding curves (Balasanov, 2018; Titcomb, 
2020). In contrast to the decentralised markets of Hayek, lately, market experi-
ments on such distributed ledger technologies (as well as indeed in market design 
efforts by economic disciplines, see Frankel et al. (2019); Ossandón (2019)) have 
been perceived less as a perfect, universal coordination mechanism and more in 
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terms of social engineering to achieve certain behavioural outcomes. 
4. A critical look at decentralisation 
In the context of network technologies, various discourses often conflate three as-
pects of decentralisation. First, decentralisation is a principle for design and engi-
neering which can be used as a means to achieve certain properties. Second, it can 
be an aim, where a given system is intended to have decentralising effects, for ex-
ample decentralising the load of computation. Finally, it can also be a claim, 
whereby a given system is designated as a decentralised system, but does not al-
ways live up to that in its deployment. It is important to distinguish between 
these. 
The dangers of confusing design principles, aims, and claims become pronounced 
when abstract network topologies start to serve as templates for social, economic, 
or political modes of organisation (Schneider, 2019). The political, social, or eco-
nomic aims of decentralisation (more autonomy, reduction of power asymmetries, 
elimination of market monopolies, direct involvement in decision making, solidari-
ty among members of voluntary associations) are laudable goals in and of them-
selves. However, such aspirations should not be too easily conflated with particu-
lar engineering solutions. A decentralised network topology might not produce de-
centralising social and political effects and might not even be particularly decen-
tralised in its technical deployment. For example, a cryptocurrency system might 
comprise a distributed network of nodes, while producing highly centralised ef-
fects in terms of wealth or other resources, or a protocol might be designed and 
promoted as distributed but then only be run on a handful machines owned by the 
same company. 
Full decentralisation of social, economic, or political relations is difficult and over-
ly relies on an idea of an autonomous individual or rational economic agent that is 
willing and able to participate. Consequently, many distributed applications and 
services rarely consider the social coordination functions. When they do, they are 
designed as abstract mechanisms such as vote casting, delegation and aggrega-
tion. More sophisticated governance mechanisms (with experiments in incorporat-
ing reputation scores, tokenised accounting of contributions and dispute resolution) 
often remain underutilised, because participation in such mechanisms is simply 
too costly for the individual. This often creates a certain structurelessness in the so-
cial, political dimension. Indeed, a seminal text by Jo Freeman titled The Tyranny of 
Structurelessness (1972), originally written in the context of horizontal organising 
in feminist political collectives, has been often quoted in online forums discussing 
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power dynamics in blockchain communities. As De Filippi and Loveluck (2016) 
have pointed out: seemingly horizontal, unstructured organisations risk not recog-
nising and preventing hidden hierarchies and centralised power dynamics. 
The more general issue at hand relates to the relative costs and benefits of distrib-
uted versus centralised networks. Nodes in distributed networks have to provide 
technical and sometimes human resources for the network, such as running a se-
cure node, with sufficient bandwidth, computing, or storage capacity, or providing 
knowledge, engagement, and participation in the governance processes. Centrali-
sation allows individual nodes, persons to offload some of these burdens, while 
still enjoying the benefits of the network. The potential costs of failure of the cen-
tral node may be high, but as long as the perceived risk of failure is low, centrali-
sation may be a reasonable choice. In most cases, the cost benefit analysis may 
point towards more centralised architectures. In contrast, the individual costs of 
being in a distributed network are relatively high, while the benefits can be very 
narrow, and specific. Take, for example, the privacy protecting Tor network. Tor is 
able to give reasonable levels of privacy at the cost of using a distributed network 
to route messages with lower speeds, and larger latency. These costs are apparent-
ly too large for everyday users who are willing to settle for lower levels of privacy. 
On the other hand, for political dissidents who fear government retribution, jour-
nalists, whose integrity depends on their ability to protect their sources, and other 
groups for whom strong privacy is essential, the cost-benefit analysis justifies the 
higher costs of using this distributed network. 
Last but not least, distributed networks often come with a substantial degree of 
openness. The goal of censorship resistance limits the conditions of joining a net-
work to the acceptance of some basic rules, protocols, or standards. Therefore, the 
boundaries of a distributed network are porous. The inability of the individual net-
work members to police the network’s boundaries, and the distributed networks’ 
strategy to tolerate, rather than to police potential bad behaviour leaves these net-
works vulnerable to both tragedies of the commons: under-provision of critical re-
sources, and the overuse / capture of the value that the network provides. For ex-
ample, in open P2P file sharing networks individual downloaders have little incen-
tive to keep uploading the content after they have downloaded it. This limitation 
leaves long-tail content inaccessible without further rules. Closed, membership 
only torrent trackers emerged to address this problem with strict accounting of up-
loads and downloads, and with the establishment of strong community norms that 
favour cooperative behaviour, even without strong enforcement mechanisms in 
place (Bodó, 2014; Kash et al., 2012). 
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Over-use as a problem emerges if selfish actors can capture the value provided by 
the network. For example, selfish users may clog the limited capacity of the Tor 
network by video streaming or file-sharing. Value overuse can also happen if the 
network resource is non-competitive. The legitimacy of both the BitTorrent and the 
bitcoin networks have been profoundly shaped by their illicit uses, and illegal uses 
may capture the overall value of the network, and deny that for legitimate uses. 
5. Conclusion 
The currently fashionable web 3.0 discourse tends to frame decentralisation as a 
panacea to a swath of social, economic, political woes. Indeed, without distributed 
protocols, we would not have the internet, and a number of highly consequential 
digital technologies, from P2P networks to distributed computing infrastructures. 
We argue in this article that decentralised, and distributed networks are exactly 
that: network topologies, with a number of predominantly technical properties. 
Though these network topologies may have many things in common with particu-
lar social, political, economic forms of organisation, their relationship is far from 
straightforward. A distributed network does not automatically yield an egalitarian, 
equitable or just social, economic, political landscape. Therefore, we should not 
expect, and must not limit the role of technology to replace existing centralised 
social structures, however far they seem to fall from these laudable, utopian ideals. 
Instead, we may think about distributed networks as one element in a complex, in-
terdependent framework of how we govern ourselves. In this framework, there are 
indeed badly organised centralised structures, which abuse the power they have, 
but we also have time-tested ways to ensure that such centralised institutions are 
trustworthy (Sztompka, 1999). Likewise, some distributed systems work so well 
that they have already sunk into the background as an infrastructure. Meanwhile 
others developed hybrid operational forms in which distributed elements and 
more hierarchical forms of collaboration mutually support and reinforce each oth-
er, as in the case of Wikipedia. Still others, like most blockchain projects, are still 
searching for governance logics from which more centralised elements can be ex-
cluded. The fact that such efforts fail says little about whether this failure is the 
inevitable conclusion or just a precondition of success of these efforts (Daub, 
2020). 
In any case, it seems likely that the revolution will not be radically decentralised 
(O’Dwyer, 2015). Distributed techno-social networks may position themselves as 
antagonists of the current powers that be, and they may even be successful in 
maintaining politically, economically stable technological autonomous zones, but 
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their true potential probably lies elsewhere. 
No social, political, economic system is truly monolithic. Usually, we rely on a mul-
titude of coexisting and cooperating systems to facilitate the same thing. Just as 
the robustness of a distributed system comes from the multiplication of the means 
through which something takes place, so does the robustness of our complex so-
cial, economic organisation depend on having multiple different systems to 
achieve similar goals. 
We warn against a proselytising zeal with regards to distribution as an overarching 
organisational template. A better understanding of the power and limitations of 
decentralisation is necessary and would allow for hybrid approaches and less sim-
plistic assumptions about what decentralisation can or cannot achieve. 
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